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partnership will play a crucial role in efforts to tackle 
the current migration policy challenges – i.e., the 
lack of prospects for young people in Africa and the 
importance of multilateral cooperation – but also 
to address them profitably from a market economy 
perspective. 
However, cooperation with African states has to 
date been characterized by strong asymmetries and 
diverging interests that cannot be easily reconciled. In 
recent years, the migration debate in Europe has been 
dominated by a defensive attitude, and the poten- 
tially cooperative relationship with African states has 
tended to deteriorate. Both sides perceive instruments 
and actors as being at odds with each other.
Migration and (forced) return, in particular, often be-
come mere bargaining chips. The solution can only be 
found in a collaboration on migration that is based on 
partnership between Germany (within the framework 
of the EU) and African states.
In political terms, Africa is becoming more and more 
important for Germany. For example, its Federal Gov-
ernment has stated that it has “recognized the signi-
ficance and potential of our neighboring continent and 
is striving for a deeper partnership.” German politi-
cians have never travelled to African countries as often 
as they have in recent years. One of the key reasons 
behind this is the issue of migration, as the so-called 
“displacement crisis” has heralded a new era in terms 
of foreign policies on Africa and migration. 
The issue is also becoming increasingly charged due 
to demographic developments on the African conti-
nent and the shortage of skilled workers in Germany. 
Against this background, cooperation in a spirit of 
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African migration: myths and facts  
Despite the growth records on the so-called “conti-
nent of opportunities” and a stronger self-confi- 
dence of the African Union (AU), such as with the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
project, the public debate and German policy are 
marked by certain misperceptions.
For example, the predicted population growth – al-
beit regionally immense, but at very different levels 
of intensity – cannot automatically be translated 
into increasing migration to Europe (Angenendt et 
al. 2017). United Nations (UN) statistics speak of 
an increase from the current 970 million to around 
2.2 billion people in 2050. The number of Africans 
immigrating to Germany has fallen sharply in recent 
years, thereby almost reaching the level from before 
the displacement crisis. The same applies to initial 
applications for asylum, which in any case already 
accounted for only a small proportion (11.4 percent) 
of all applications (BAMF 2020). African migration 
only constitutes 14.1 percent of global migration, 
which is much smaller than the share of migration 
in or out of Asia and Europe. Roughly 70 percent 
of all sub-Saharan migrants remain on the conti-
nent (MIF 2019), and only about a quarter of African 
emigrants have Europe as a migration destination. 
Migration and mobility (especially within regions) are 
part of the normal course of life and often self-evi-
dent survival strategies. The vast majority of “mobi-
le” people are those migrating from the countryside 
to the city, regional refugees or internally displaced 
persons (approx. 17 million). So-called irregular mi-
gration to Europe – i.e., without an entry permit – is 
more of the exception than the rule in this context.
Decreasing migration figures from non-EU states are 
reducing the domestic political pressure in Germa-
ny. Meanwhile, given the shortage of skilled wor-
kers (which is not a result of short-term economic 
developments), Germany is attempting to enhance its 
status as an attractive destination country for third 
countries in order to maintain its economic prospe-
rity. In purely numerical terms, the high youth-un-
employment rate in many African countries repre-
sents an important source of potential labor for the 
German market. However, there is a large skills gap 
between African and European countries, even among 
the best-qualified people, who are already coming to 
Europe today due to a lack of qualified job opportuni-
ties at home.
FIGURE 1   Migration and mobility to and from Africa – 2017
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German Migration Policy in Africa 
– Framework and Objectives
For a long time, Germany’s policies on Africa were 
primarily geared toward development and economic 
cooperation. The displacement crisis has changed 
this, and it is increasingly being considered crucial to 
prevent flight and migration. This has led Germany 
to give its Africa policies a stronger focus on security 
policy, especially in the Sahel region and the Horn of 
Africa. As a result, beginning in 2015, Germany has 
expanded its institutional resources and strategically 
repositioned itself in terms of migration policy.
Individual German states, such as Baden-Württem-
berg and North Rhine-Westphalia, are also active 
in Africa. In addition, municipalities are engaged in 
foreign policy in the form of town twin/sister city 
programs. A large number of civil society and eco-
nomic actors, including migrants, as well as political 
foundations are pursuing their own or joint strate-
gies for Africa.
The Federal Government’s approach 
In view of this federal diversity, a coherent German 
foreign policy on Africa and migration is difficult for 
African and sometimes European partner govern-
ments to discern. The revised version of the Federal 
Government’s Africa Policy Guidelines (March 2019) 
states for the first time that “managing and shaping 
migration, tackling the causes of refugee move-
ments [and] supporting refugees” are collectively 
one of the five core objectives and thereby part of a 
comprehensive Africa policy. The Federal Govern-
ment’s comprehensive Strategy for Migration and 
Development (AA, BMI and BMZ 2016) focuses on 1) 
causes of flight and irregular migration, 2) the pro-
tection of refugees, 3) legal migration and migration 
management, and 4) return and reintegration. In 
doing so, it is following Switzerland’s “whole-of-
government” approach.
TABLE 1   Selected Programs of German and European External Migration Policy in Africa 
BMZ/GIZ Tackling the root causes of displacement, stabilising host regions, supporting refugees 
BMZ/GIZ and BMI Migration for Development Programme, i.a. Returning to New Opportunities
GIZ/International Services Sustainable Recruitment of Nurses (Triple Win)
BMZ/GIZ/EUTF Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in Africa
BMZ/GIZ/EUTF Better Migration Management
BMZ/GIZ
Partnership-based Approaches to Development-Oriented Training and Labour Migration  
(Partnerschaftliche Ansätze für entwicklungsorientierte Ausbildungs- und Arbeitsmigration – PAM)
EU Migration Partnership Framework
EUTF/ILO* Towards Free Movement and Transhumance in the IGAD region
ECOWAS/EU/IOM/ILO/ICMPD FMM West Africa (Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa)
EUTF/ IOM** 
EUTF/AA
Border Management ECOWAS, e.g.  Strengthening the Sustainable Management of the Consequen-
ces of Migration Flows (Niger); Support Programme for Integrated Border Management in Burkina 
Faso
EU/ICMPD Mobility Partnership Facility
*ILO: International Labour Organization; **IOM: International Organization for Migration
Expansion of ministerial resources for migration and 
Africa
The relevant ministries – especially the Federal Minis-
try for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Com-
munity (BMI), and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) – 
have employed additional resources to create thematic 
units on flight, migration and return and to develop ex-
pertise on migration. However, other ministries, such as 
the Ministry of Economics (BMWi) and the Ministry of 
Finance (BMF), have also intensified their activities rela-
ted to Africa and migration. The Federal Foreign Office 
(AA) plays the role of the central coordinator both in-
ternally and externally, including vis-à-vis the EU. In ad-
dition, a network of diplomats dedicated to specific is-
sues has been established in Africa.
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According to statements by government representa-
tives, interdepartmental implementation in Ger-
many has been more successful than department-
specific implementation. Nevertheless, individual 
policy approaches stand in the way of others, are 
one-sided or have shortcomings in terms of co-
ordination. The current shift toward the dominant 
paradigm of combating the causes of flight is most 
evident at the BMZ. The special initiative “Tackling 
the Root Causes of displacement, stabilising host 
regions, supporting refugees” is by far the largest 
of four new BMZ initiatives aimed at mitigating 
the causes of flight and migration. However, their 
application in crisis regions is at odds with the desire 
to reduce the causes of displacement in a sustainable 
and structural manner, as the aim in these cases is 
often to rapidly curb irregular migration. By failing 
to differentiate between acute and structural causes 
of flight, policymakers run the risk of spending too 
much development policy funding on combating 
migration (Kipp and Koch 2018).
One part of the special initiative is, for example, the 
“Returning to New Opportunities” project in the 
“Migration for Development” (PME) program, which 
focuses on voluntary, assisted return and reintegra-
tion. The associated migration information centers in 
selected African countries are also supposed to pro-
vide formal advice on legal migration routes, but they 
are hardly ever used for this purpose and thereby 
represent a rather restrictive approach. As a result, 
the local populations take a critical view of them.
In 2017, dubbed the “German Africa Year,” a new 
dimension of development cooperation was intro-
duced that involved the (private) sector and aimed 
to sustainably improve economic conditions in 
African countries and, above all, to support small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in making 
investments. The central strategy document is 
the Compact with Africa (CwA) of the Ministry of 
Finance, which was initiated within the framework 
of the Germany’s G20 presidency and the BMZ’s 
Marshall Plan with Africa (MPA). These initiatives 
also support the view that changing conditions in 
African countries will reduce the incentives for flight 
and migration (see Kappel 2019).
In addition, Germany has become Europe’s pioneer 
in innovative individual initiatives on legal migra- 
tion (SVR 2019) and increasingly also in Africa. 
Examples include the „Triple Win“ project for the 
recruitment of nursing staff (since 2013 in Tunisia) 
of GIZ, Germany‘s association for international co-
operation; the regional project „Towards a Holistic 
Approach to Labour Migration Governance and  
Labour Mobility in North Africa“ (since 2019 within 
the framework of the EU Emergency Trust Fund, 
EUTF); and the BMZ’s new “Partnership-based 
Approaches to Development-Oriented Training and 
Labour Migration (PAM)” program, which is cur-
rently conducting an analysis of potential in Nigeria, 
among other things.
Since March 1, 2020, the Skilled Immigration Act 
(FEG) has improved regular migration routes. 
However, access to the labor market for low- and 
medium-skilled workers remains limited, and it is 
difficult to secure recognition of educational and 
professional qualifications attained abroad, although 
there are plans to improve this. Standards in African 
countries are currently hardly compatible with those 
in Germany.
Germany within the EU context  
Although Germany is engaging in more bilateral 
action in Africa, it is primarily active in external  
migration policy within the framework of the EU. 
Since 1999, decisions have been made in the EU’s 
High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migra-
tion, and implemented in external migration dia- 
logues, regional processes, and mobility and migra-
tion partnerships (Kipp and Koch 2018).
In contrast to the United Nations Global Compact 
for Migration, the European Migration Agenda (May 
2015) defines migration as a problem. The sub-
sequent Valletta Process (since November 2015) is 
meant to address solutions together with African 
states that will receive funding from the EUTF and 
can be deployed flexibly and without the monitoring 
function of the European Parliament.
Marshall Plan with Africa and Compact with Africa
The MPA implements the CwA with so-called re-
form partnerships in selected “particularly reform-
oriented” countries (so far Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal). Since 
2019, it has been accompanied by the BMZ spe-
cial initiative for “training and employment,” which 
aims to create 100,000 jobs and 30,000 training 
positions in the coming years. In contrast to the 
MPA, the CwA does not aim at economic and so-
cial transformation in order to create sustainable 
jobs, but instead focuses especially on infrastruc-
ture improvements.
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The Valletta Action Plan and the strategy for im-
plementing the EUTF include agreements among 
EU member states, such as ones to improve legal 
migration and mobility, which is in the interest of 
African states. However, what is done in practice is 
at odds with the objectives. In this case, a shortterm 
focus is placed on policies to curb irregular migra- 
tion, including through job-creation measures; 
while 90 percent of these measures are funded by 
the long-term-oriented European Development 
Fund (European Commission 2019). Germany is 
by far the largest bilateral donor, supplying €225 
million, followed by Italy, supplying €123 million 
(EUTF 2020).
The European Partnership Framework, which was 
created in the course of the new Migration Agen-
da and the Valletta Process, particularly pursues a 
highly restrictive approach by linking development 
with migration and making “fast and operatio-
nal returns” the “paramount priority” (European 
Commission 2016). Five central African countries of 
transit and origin of irregular migration to the EU 
(Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) were 
identified as priority countries.
Driven by a split in public opinion on migration, 
this fundamental imbalance between restricting, 
controlling and being open to migration also has a 
source in EU member states’ sovereign right to legal 
migration: While some countries want to prevent 
migration altogether, others want to attract pro-
fessionals with specific skills. For example, some 
projects aim to promote regional mobility within 
Africa, but limit it via restrictive components, such 
as (voluntary) return and border security at the 
same time.
Examples are the EUTF’s Towards Free Movement 
and Transhumance in the IGAD Region project (Su-
dan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya 
and Uganda) or the Support to Free Movement of 
Persons and Migration (FMM) project in the Econo-
mic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
as opposed to the regional EUTF programs on border 
security and “migrant smuggling” that are being 
supported by Germany. In the meantime, the first 
initiatives on legal migration to Europe are emer-
ging, such as within the framework of the Mobility 
Partnership Facility.
Overall, the current EU frameworks of the Global 
Approach for Migration and Mobility (GAM/M),  
and especially the mobility partnerships, are giving 
the EU more room for maneuver in the area of legal 
migration, although so far only on paper (SVR 2019).
Migration Policy within the 
African Union 
The topic of migration has various facets for African 
states when it comes to cooperation with the EU. In 
West Africa, for example, socioeconomic aspects – 
such as country development, employment, educa-
tion, health, sanitation and infrastructure – have a 
much higher priority than migration policy (Adam 
et al. 2019). An exception is often the issue of forced 
return, especially in West and East Africa. Negotia-
tions, but also individual returns, especially in larger 
groups, are sometimes sharply attacked in the media 
and are often accompanied by protests (Zanker et al. 
2019). 
The EU Migration Partnership Framework  
As a complement to the mobility partnerships 
(MPs) that have existed since 2005 but have 
hardly been implemented – including with Cape 
Verde, Morocco and Tunisia – EU migration part-
nerships are meant to enable more binding coope-
ration on migration policy between the EU and 
African states. However, the focus on return and 
migration control has made some countries (e.g., 
Mali and Ethiopia) skeptical and unwilling to co-
operate. More and more informal agreements are 
being concluded now, which is an explicit prior- 
ity of the partnership’s framework. Granted, this  
is making it possible to address the issue of de-
portations in return states, which is unpopular in 
Africa. But it is also increasing popular distrust of 
“backroom deals” (Zanker et al. 2019). Not much 
has been happening with the EU Migration Part-
nership Framework for two years now, which is 
partly due to its asymmetrical architecture desig-
ned according to European interests. It is ques-
tionable whether such agreements can be broad- 
ened to also include the necessary concessions to 
African states.
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With its Agenda 2063 (2013), the African Union is 
breaking new ground in intercontinental mobility 
and development. The Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) is an important project in this context, 
and it aims to expand its own market and stimulate 
trade and joint value creation through mutual market 
opening and the harmonization of standards. To date, 
however, there have been numerous intra-continental 
barriers and hurdles. Moreover, most African states, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, only have a very 
weak foreign trade position, with most of them con-
tinuing to serve as suppliers of raw materials. Many 
are driving structural change with industrial concepts, 
and some, such as Kenya and Rwanda, are experien-
cing strong growth. In this case, regional economic 
integration will be essential. The Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons, adopted in January 2018, even 
provides for an African passport. While the AfCFTA 
has been signed by all 55 African states (except Eri-
trea) and ratified by 28, the protocol so far has only 32 
signatures and four ratifications (AU 2020). It remains 
to be seen how Germany and the EU can and will sup-
port these approaches.
In May 2018, the AU published a Migration Policy 
Framework for Africa (AU 2018), which emphasizes 
the areas of diaspora engagement, internal migra-
tion, and migration and trade. The approach pursues 
a positive mobility and migration concept that ties in 
with the AU’s AfCFTA projects and the Protocol on the 
Free Movement of Persons. Germany, one of the most 
important donors to the AU, supports this work. Many 
African countries have introduced migration policies 
in recent years, although these policies also contain 
restrictive components due to European migration 
interests.
Challenges of Cooperation in  
Migration Partnerships 
 
The EU collaborative partnership with Africa got its 
official start with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007) 
and, in terms of migration policy, with the Dialogue 
on Migration and Mobility. Today, however, there 
can be no talk of achieving the political objective of a 
partnership on an equal footing. Instead, the current 
migration cooperation between the EU, Germany and 
African states has repeatedly been criticized as being 
one-sided and as domestic policy by other means 
(Castillejo 2017). In contrast, in many African states, 
migration is an individual and social development 
strategy. 
The rhetoric of European governments and EU  
representatives directed toward African states and 
the AU is surprisingly similar, even if their objec- 
tives differ. In particular, the EU’s restrictive  
practice differs greatly from its partly management-
oriented discourse (Zanker 2019). Although the term 
“partnership” does appear repeatedly in most docu-
ments, instruments like the unequal EU migration 
partnerships often do not work as a result of African 
states’ refusal to take migrants back. In this respect, 
they do not represent an improvement over the 
hardly used EU mobility partnerships. Commitments 
by African states to EU policy often only pay lip 
service to them, as there is sometimes little interest 
in political implementation. However, states like 
Niger are celebrated as examples of success. Afri-
can governments are dependent on EU and German 
funds, such as for capacity-building materials and 
as additional economic and development aid. On the 
other hand, some countries that are transition and 
increasingly also destination countries, such as Mo-
rocco, are clearly pursuing their own interests when 
it comes to border security (Koch et al. 2018).
Nevertheless, European states and Germany are 
dependent on cooperation with African states to 
implement their policies. For African states, this 
creates new scope for action in an asymmetrical 
relationship. Migration policy has thus become an 
instrument of power. A large number of migration 
summits, regional processes and dialogue forums 
enable a kind of “venue shopping” in which some 
African governments can more or less choose topics 
and cooperation partners. At the same time, this is 
a result of unilateral action by EU states, with parts 
of the EU either blocking or slowing down decision-
making. 
The Way Forward  
The dominance of the restrictive approach to 
migration in Europe in recent years has tended to 
exacerbate what could be a relationship of partner-
ship with African states. At the same time, however, 
productive cooperation is becoming increasingly 
important to both sides. Germany and Europe need 
Africa for multilateral cooperation, as the latter is a 
growing market and because the lack of prospects 
for its young population will partly translate into 
migration and flight, and thereby affect the former 
more directly. The following factors will be essential 
for bringing about a cooperation based on migration 
partnership that is worthy of the name:
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Reciprocity instead of one-sidedness 
 
Asymmetries, inequalities and conflicting interests 
must be recognized as such and, as far as possib-
le, resolved via fair compromises so that a “might 
makes right” situation does not emerge. It must 
be clear that the ability of African actors to interact 
with European actors on migration policy depends 
on their having the ability to use the instruments 
offered by Europe and Germany in their own interest 
(Koch et al. 2018). Decisive for cooperation on mi- 
gration policy will be 1) the role of migration (na- 
tional, regional, intra- or extra-continental), 2) the 
economic embedding of migration and remittances, 
and 3) an interest in designing and implementing 
policies.
Instead of concluding new agreements, existing 
instruments should be used, especially in the area 
of legal migration. Germany and the EU will remain 
non-credible actors as long as they do not fulfill 
their promises to cooperate on migration on an 
equal footing. Established relations, including bi-
lateral ones, are crucial for successful cooperation. 
Germany can build on many years of experience with 
negotiating development and economic policies – 
solely because of its dense network of German mis-
sions abroad, which has now been augmented by the 
migration information centers. German and Euro-
pean actors should be aware of their own limited role 
and opportunities to act independently in Africa. 
Any work on the African continent can only take 
place in close cooperation with actors on the ground 
and at all levels. The transnational social and eco-
nomic relations of the diaspora (known as the “sixth 
region” of Africa) should be used for this purpose 
– through active networking with business, politics 
and civil society. Transit and destination countries 
should be more closely integrated into the process  
of policy- and decision-making, and the advantages 
of bilateral cooperation should be taken into consid-
eration. African regional organizations (e.g., ECO-
WAS, IGAD) also play an important role in migration 
management. Nevertheless, in view of conflicting 
interests within the EU on policies of deterrence, 
restriction and selective opening, there will continue 
to be conflicting objectives.
The central role of migration and mobility 
The promotion of regular immigration opportunities 
– over and above the narrative of reducing the root 
causes of flight – will be key for enabling respectful 
cooperation and political agreements on commit-
ments, even if there is little evidence to date that 
legal migration reduces irregular entry into Europe 
(Bither and Ziebarth 2019). Beyond the concentration 
on skilled professionals, fair and profitable migration 
opportunities should be created for parts of the African 
population. In this case, the FEG can serve as a foun-
dation for the expansion of regular access routes: 
• More research and practical testing should be 
conducted on the instrument of Global Skill Partner-
ships, which are a “triple win” in terms of sustain-
able development, as they also take into account 
both the educational system and the labor market in 
the country of origin and in Germany (Clemens et al. 
2019). 
• In addition to promising legal migration routes, mi-
gration information centers should also make them 
possible in practice. They can be important local 
and transnational centers for exchange and policy 
implementation at all levels.
• The focus on mobility within African regions should 
be strengthened, and the AU and regional organi-
zations should receive support for their integration 
plans that is not at odds with their own policies.
• Programs such as Erasmus, training scholarships 
and expert-exchange programs should be expanded 
in order to foster stronger networks. 
• The return of migrants should not be used as a bar-
gaining chip, and deportations should be avoided 
whenever possible. A soft-touch handling of African 
sensitivities and the critical public will achieve more 
than forced concessions.
• Economic and technological cooperation should be 
deepened, and a broader structural transformation 
of local societies should be supported. Commitment 
to less asymmetrical trade relations can contribute 
to structural development in Africa as well as an 
orderly migration of skilled workers and trainees.
In the end, cooperation can only come about via a 
more open visa policy. Meetings of civil society or 
scholars often fail as a result of restrictive policies 
on issuing visas – which is the opposite of a collabo-
ration based on partnership. 
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Outlook 
Africa will play an increasingly important role in 
this century. It is crucial to enter into a productive 
exchange at all levels with the actors on this con-
tinent, with its diversity and immense potential 
for transformation and innovation. At the same 
time, it is urgently necessary to view migration 
as a positive part of economic development and 
social change.
Germany’s EU Council Presidency, which will 
begin in July 2020, will make Africa one of its cen-
tral focuses. This is an opportunity for Germany 
to make progress on issues that are less focused 
on restrictions, including regular humanitarian 
access routes, refugee protection and, above all, 
legal migration (SVR 2020). Germany can play a 
pioneering role in these efforts and, together with 
other European states, usher in a new era of part-
nership-based and dialogue-oriented migration 
cooperation.
